vrijdag 27 september 2013
woensdag 21 augustus 2013
ہالینڈ میں پاکستانی ایمبیسی میں چند گھنٹے
دنیا کی کسی بھی ایمبیسی میں ویزا، پاسپورٹ وغیرہ کی غرض سے جاتے ہوئے یہ کھٹکا لگا رہتا ہے کہ آیا یہ کام ہو گا کہ نہیں مگر پاکستانی ایمبیسی کا رخ کرو تو پہلے سے ہی یہ خیال ہوتا ہے کہ انھوں نے میری درخواست کو قبول نہیں کرنا۔ ایسا گمان کیوں جنم لیتا ہے یہ ہم آگے بیان کریں گے، مگر ایسی صورتحال کو پیش نظر رکھتے ہوئے ہر درخواست گزار پہلے سے ہی ناکام نظروں کے ساتھ اپنی درخواست برائے ویزہ یا پاسپورٹ وغیرہ کے ہر نکتے پہ غور کرتا ہےکہ کہیں اس پہ اعتراض نہ ہو جائے۔ اس لحاظ سے آپ کی بظاہر مکمل درخواست دہندگی کا حال ہالینڈ کی موجودہ سیاسی پناہ کی پالیسی جیسا ہے کہ جس میں سیاسی پناہ کے خواہشمندوں کو یہ 'ثابت' بھی کرنا ہوتا ہے کہ وہ واقعی پناہ کے 'صحیح' امیدوار ہیں۔
بظاہر تو پاکستانی ایمبیسی نے اپنی ویب سائیٹ پر تمام ضروری معلومات مہیّا کی ہیں جو کہ حصول ویزہ، پاسپورٹ کی حصولی یا تجدید وغیرہ کے لیے ضروری ہیں، مگر آیا یہ مذکورہ دستاویزات آپ کی درخواست کے لیے کافی ہیں، اس کا اصل امتحان اس وقت ہوتا ہے جب آپ کا سامنا کاؤنٹر پہ موجود اہلکار سے ہو۔ اس عمل کا مشاہدہ ہر اس شخص نے کیا ہو گا جس نے اپنے کسی کام کی وجہ سے چند گھنٹے ایمبیسی میں گذارے ہوں۔ اس حوالے سے اپنے چند مشاھدات درج ہیں:
ایمبیسی داخل ہونے پر دیکھا کہ ایک صاحب کاؤنٹر پر کھڑے اس بات پر معترض تھے کہ ان سے اب پوچھی جانے والی دستاویز کا ذکر ایمبیسی کی ویب سائیٹ پر موجود نہیں اور نہ ہی اسے فون پہ آگاہ کیا گیا۔ موصوف نے بچوں کے لیے ۔ICOPN۔ کارڈ بنوانا تھا، جس کے لیے اس نے ویب سائیٹ پہ درج متعلقہ دستاویزات اکٹھی کی تھیں اور آنے سے ایک دن قبل ایمبیسی میں فون کر کے مزید تصدیق کر لی تھی کہ آیا اسکے تیارکردہ کاغذات درست ہیں۔ مگر جب کاؤنٹر پہ پہنچے تو اہلکار نے کہا کہ آپ نے تو اپنے والد کے شناختی کارڈ کی فوٹو کاپی بھی لگانی تھی۔ درخواست گزار کا کہنا تھا کہ یہ اسے پہلے کیوں نہ بتایا گیا، اور یہ کہ اس کا ذکر ویب سائیٹ پہ بھی موجود نہیں؟ مگر اہلکار کا کہنا تھا کہ آپ کی شناخت کے لیے یہ ضروری ہے، اگر یہ فوٹو کاپی نہ لگائی گئی تو آپکی درخواست مکمل نہ ہو گی۔ اس پر اہلکار اور درخواست گزار کے درمیان ایک بحث چھڑ گئی اور درخواست گزار کی مایوسی کا اندازہ اسکی بلند ہوتی آواز سے بخوبی لگایا جا سکتا تھا۔
ایک اور صاحب اپنے بیٹے کے پاسپورٹ کی تجدید کے لیے آئے تھے۔ پانچ سال قبل انھوں نے یہ پاسپورٹ یہیں سے تجدید کرایا تھا۔ موصوف کے کاغذات کو دیکھ کر ایمبیسی کے اہلکار نے کہا کہ آپ اپنا 'ب-فارم' بھی دیجیے۔ درخواست گزار نے کہا کہ 'ب-فارم' تو پاسپورٹ بنواتے ہوئے ضروری ہوتا ہے اور ویسے بھی یہ پاسپورٹ پہلے یہیں سے تجدید ہوا ہے اس وقت کسی نے 'ب-فارم' کا مطالبہ نہ کیا تھا۔ مگر ایمبیسی کے عملہ کے کان پر کوئی جوں تک نہ رینگی اور وہ اپنی بات پہ بضد رہے کہ 'ب-فارم' کے ساتھ دوبارہ آئیں۔ اب ذرا بتائیے کہ دور دراز کے شہروں سے دیگرکام چھوڑکر روزانہ ایمبیسی کے چکر لگانا کیا آسان کام ہے۔
بظاہر تو عام آدمی ایمبیسی کے عملے کی من مانی باتوں کا شکار نظر آتا ہے مگر یہ اہلکار ایک بڑے کھیل کے محض پرزے نظر آتے ہیں۔ دیکھا جائے تو 'نادرا' نے اپنی ویب سائیٹ اور خدمات کو کافی بہتر کیا ہے کہ اندرون اوربیرون ملک آپ کسی بھی جگہ سے اپنے ڈاکومنٹس چیک کروا اورمنگوا سکتے ہیں۔ 'نادرا' کے یہ ڈاکومنٹس حکومت کے لیے ذریعۂآمدنی بھی ہیں مگراس کے پیچھے کچھ اور پہلو بھی پنہاں ہیں۔ پچھلے کچھ سالوں سے امریکنوں نے اپنی نام نہاد 'دھشت گردی کے خلاف جنگ' کے لیے کچھہ اخراجات 'نادرا' کی نگہداشت پہ لگائے ہیں تاکہ اندرون اوربیرون ملک پاکستانیوں پہ بہتر نظر رکھی جا سکے۔ اس کا ایک نتیجہ یہ ہے کہ 'نادرا' کے سسٹم میں اندراج کو مشکل بنا دیا گیا ہے۔ جب 'نادرا' کے اس سسٹم میں داخلے کے لیے بیرون ملک ایمبیسیوں کا عملہ ضرروی اور غیر ضرروی دستاویزات کا مطالبہ کرتا ہے، تو بظاہر ان کا مقصد یہ ہےکہ سسٹم میں اندراج کے عمل میں کوئی خامی نہ رہے۔ مگر عوام کے لیے یہ سب کچھہ بسا اوقات ایک تکلیف دہ عمل ہے۔ نتیجتا" اگر ایمبیسی کے اہلکار آپ کے کاغذات قبول کر لیں تو آپ سمجھتے ہیں کہ آپکے سر سے ایک بہت بڑا بوجھ اتر گیا ہو۔
zaterdag 18 mei 2013
Verkiezingen in Pakistan: ‘revolutie’ bleef uit
De verkiezingsuitslag van afgelopen weekend gaf een dominante meerderheid aan de centrumrechtse partij van Sharif; de verkiezingen zijn een enorme nederlaag voor de regerende coalitie onder leiding van de Volkspartij van Zardari, weduwnaar van de vermoorde Bhutto. Economisch wanbeleid, gebrek aan veiligheid, werkloosheid en corruptie onder Zadari leidden tot impopulariteit van de partij. De hype rondom de politieke mars van Imran Khan bleef vooral een media aangelegenheid.
De verkiezingen betekenen een stap richting het versterken van de democratie in het land. Het is de eerste keer dat de macht overgaat van de ene democratisch gekozen regering naar de andere zonder een inmenging van het machtige instituut van het leger. De opkomst, meer dan 60%, heeft bevestigd dat een overweldigend aantal kiezers de dreigementen van de Taliban heeft genegeerd, ondanks het feit dat meer dan honderd mensen omkwamen in de week voor de verkiezingen.
Concurrerende utopieën
De hoge opkomst is vooral te danken aan een grote mobilisatie onder jongeren en vrouwen. Imran Khan, een bevlogen, extravagante en charismatische leider die eerder aanvoerder was van het nationale cricketteam, slaagde erin om jongeren van welgestelde families, studenten, en de opkomende middenklasse in met name de rijke delen van steden te mobiliseren. Wat ook wel de ‘burger generatie’ wordt genoemd, werd gemobiliseerd tegen de corruptie en het machtmisbruik door gevestigde politieke partijen en voor een ‘change’. Khan beloofde economische rechtvaardigheid en welvaart zoals in de Scandinavische landen. Het ‘Scandinavische model’ is volgens Khan immers afgeleid van ‘Umar ka qanoon’ ofwel het Systeem van Umar - een verwijzing naar de tijd van de tweede Kalief van de Islam die bekendstaat om rechtvaardigheid en welvaart. Khan wilde ook een onafhankelijk buitenlandse politieke bedrijven en Pakistan weghalen uit het pro-Amerikaanse buitenlandbeleid van de huidige regering. Wat dat betreft zag hij de drone-aanvallen op de tribale gebieden als schendingen van de Pakistaanse soevereiniteit. Deze retoriek werd beloond en leverde hem een meerderheid van stemmen op in een provincie langs de grens met Afghanistan die vooral getroffen is door de oorlog. Zijn aanhang is religieusgezien conservatief en veelal actief op de sociale media. Echter, gezien hun afkomst kunnen wij het effect van hun ‘change’ niet vergelijken met de jongeren uit de Arabische lente. Gezien het uitslag van de verkiezingen bleef het vooral bij een mediahype.
Het charisma en de utopie van Khan konden de traditionele delen van stad en platteland niet naar zijn kant bewegen. Daar slaagde zijn rivaal, Sharif, wel in. Vooral bekend als een kalm, ervaren en soms zelfs saai persoon, wordt de staalmagnaat voor de derde keer premier van Pakistan. In zijn voorgaande perioden bouwde hij grote projecten zoals snelwegen, en nu belooft hij een sneltrein in grote steden waar mensen nog steeds leiden onder periodieke stroomuitval. Zijn aanhang bevindt zich vooral onder de traditionele middenklasse, zoals winkeliers en handelaars, en onder de kleine en middenstand in grote en kleine steden in de provincie Punjab. Hij streeft naar economische liberalisering en een pro-industrie beleid om zo van Pakistan alsnog een ‘Aziatische tijger’ te maken. Wat dat betreft wil hij de banden met India verbeteren om investering uit dat land te realiseren. Maar dat is niet makkelijk, zoals eerder bleek in 1999 toen zijn wens werd getorpedeerd door het machtige leger en zijn regering naar huis werd gestuurd.
Veiligheid een harde noot
Het economische beleid staat niet los van de veiligheidssituatie in Pakistan. Het land wordt geteisterd door geweld van de Taliban en andere aan Al-Qaeda gelieerde extremistische groeperingen. Anders dan de vorige regering wil Sharif ‘serieuze’ onderhandelen met de Pakistaanse Taliban ten behoeve van vrede in het land. Soms wordt hij door het liberale circuit in Pakistan beticht van warme banden met enkele extreme groeperingen in Pakistan. Maar gezien het politieke mandaat dat hij heeft gekregen, moet hij wel in staat zijn de extremisten onder de duim te houden als hij veiligheidssituatie in het land wil verbeteren. Anders dan de vorige regering wil hij een onafhankelijk buitenlandbeleid met beperkte Amerikaanse inmenging. Wat dat betreft wil hij het beleid van Pakistaanse deelname aan het Amerikaanse anti-terreurbeleid en de luchtaanvallen met onbemande vliegtuigen, zogenaamde drones, herzien.
In dit opzicht komt Sharif opnieuw tegenover het leger te staan. Traditioneel heeft het Pakistaanse leger een sleutelrol in het bepalen van binnenlands en buitenlands beleid. Kan hij het leger overtuigen een andere koers te varen jegens de Taliban? Volgend jaar gaan de Westerse troepen weg uit Afghanistan. Hoewel Sharif heeft beloofd dat hij zal meewerken aan deze terugtrekking, blijft het echter de vraag in hoeverre hij de Taliban kan overtuigen mee te werken aan het vredesproces in Afghanistan. Cruciaal wat dat betreft is de opstelling van het Pakistaanse leger: zal zij zich vinden in een vredesoplossing met de Taliban in zowel Pakistan als Afghanistan? Alleen een adequate oplossing van de Talibankwestie kan de veiligheidssituatie in Pakistan verbeteren. En dat is tevens een voorwaarde voor de economische ontwikkeling waarnaar Sharif streeft.
De verkiezingen betekenen een stap richting het versterken van de democratie in het land. Het is de eerste keer dat de macht overgaat van de ene democratisch gekozen regering naar de andere zonder een inmenging van het machtige instituut van het leger. De opkomst, meer dan 60%, heeft bevestigd dat een overweldigend aantal kiezers de dreigementen van de Taliban heeft genegeerd, ondanks het feit dat meer dan honderd mensen omkwamen in de week voor de verkiezingen.
Concurrerende utopieën
De hoge opkomst is vooral te danken aan een grote mobilisatie onder jongeren en vrouwen. Imran Khan, een bevlogen, extravagante en charismatische leider die eerder aanvoerder was van het nationale cricketteam, slaagde erin om jongeren van welgestelde families, studenten, en de opkomende middenklasse in met name de rijke delen van steden te mobiliseren. Wat ook wel de ‘burger generatie’ wordt genoemd, werd gemobiliseerd tegen de corruptie en het machtmisbruik door gevestigde politieke partijen en voor een ‘change’. Khan beloofde economische rechtvaardigheid en welvaart zoals in de Scandinavische landen. Het ‘Scandinavische model’ is volgens Khan immers afgeleid van ‘Umar ka qanoon’ ofwel het Systeem van Umar - een verwijzing naar de tijd van de tweede Kalief van de Islam die bekendstaat om rechtvaardigheid en welvaart. Khan wilde ook een onafhankelijk buitenlandse politieke bedrijven en Pakistan weghalen uit het pro-Amerikaanse buitenlandbeleid van de huidige regering. Wat dat betreft zag hij de drone-aanvallen op de tribale gebieden als schendingen van de Pakistaanse soevereiniteit. Deze retoriek werd beloond en leverde hem een meerderheid van stemmen op in een provincie langs de grens met Afghanistan die vooral getroffen is door de oorlog. Zijn aanhang is religieusgezien conservatief en veelal actief op de sociale media. Echter, gezien hun afkomst kunnen wij het effect van hun ‘change’ niet vergelijken met de jongeren uit de Arabische lente. Gezien het uitslag van de verkiezingen bleef het vooral bij een mediahype.
Het charisma en de utopie van Khan konden de traditionele delen van stad en platteland niet naar zijn kant bewegen. Daar slaagde zijn rivaal, Sharif, wel in. Vooral bekend als een kalm, ervaren en soms zelfs saai persoon, wordt de staalmagnaat voor de derde keer premier van Pakistan. In zijn voorgaande perioden bouwde hij grote projecten zoals snelwegen, en nu belooft hij een sneltrein in grote steden waar mensen nog steeds leiden onder periodieke stroomuitval. Zijn aanhang bevindt zich vooral onder de traditionele middenklasse, zoals winkeliers en handelaars, en onder de kleine en middenstand in grote en kleine steden in de provincie Punjab. Hij streeft naar economische liberalisering en een pro-industrie beleid om zo van Pakistan alsnog een ‘Aziatische tijger’ te maken. Wat dat betreft wil hij de banden met India verbeteren om investering uit dat land te realiseren. Maar dat is niet makkelijk, zoals eerder bleek in 1999 toen zijn wens werd getorpedeerd door het machtige leger en zijn regering naar huis werd gestuurd.
Veiligheid een harde noot
Het economische beleid staat niet los van de veiligheidssituatie in Pakistan. Het land wordt geteisterd door geweld van de Taliban en andere aan Al-Qaeda gelieerde extremistische groeperingen. Anders dan de vorige regering wil Sharif ‘serieuze’ onderhandelen met de Pakistaanse Taliban ten behoeve van vrede in het land. Soms wordt hij door het liberale circuit in Pakistan beticht van warme banden met enkele extreme groeperingen in Pakistan. Maar gezien het politieke mandaat dat hij heeft gekregen, moet hij wel in staat zijn de extremisten onder de duim te houden als hij veiligheidssituatie in het land wil verbeteren. Anders dan de vorige regering wil hij een onafhankelijk buitenlandbeleid met beperkte Amerikaanse inmenging. Wat dat betreft wil hij het beleid van Pakistaanse deelname aan het Amerikaanse anti-terreurbeleid en de luchtaanvallen met onbemande vliegtuigen, zogenaamde drones, herzien.
In dit opzicht komt Sharif opnieuw tegenover het leger te staan. Traditioneel heeft het Pakistaanse leger een sleutelrol in het bepalen van binnenlands en buitenlands beleid. Kan hij het leger overtuigen een andere koers te varen jegens de Taliban? Volgend jaar gaan de Westerse troepen weg uit Afghanistan. Hoewel Sharif heeft beloofd dat hij zal meewerken aan deze terugtrekking, blijft het echter de vraag in hoeverre hij de Taliban kan overtuigen mee te werken aan het vredesproces in Afghanistan. Cruciaal wat dat betreft is de opstelling van het Pakistaanse leger: zal zij zich vinden in een vredesoplossing met de Taliban in zowel Pakistan als Afghanistan? Alleen een adequate oplossing van de Talibankwestie kan de veiligheidssituatie in Pakistan verbeteren. En dat is tevens een voorwaarde voor de economische ontwikkeling waarnaar Sharif streeft.
maandag 11 juni 2012
A Pakistani Mela in Amsterdam
In the month of June it was an unusual rainy day in Amsterdam, however a large number of enthusiast Pakistanis assembled at the ‘Pakistan Mela’. Unusual was also a significant participation of women, young and old, and children in the event. People had come not only from different parts of the Netherlands but also from the neighboring Germany and Belgium. In gray and moister filled Sloterpark the smell of Pakistani food and music was covering the whole park as were the colorful umbrellas of the participants. The word ‘Mela’ or ‘gathering’ or ‘festival’, is a Sanskrit word and it deals with the festivities or gatherings around the Sufi shrine and Hindu temples in South Asian villages. With urbanization it also got more secular usage, and among the South Asian diaspora communities it turns out to be an important cultural import. Thus you have Indian, Nepalese, Sikh and Pakistani versions in major cities of the UK and North America, thus also the Pakistani Mela in Amsterdam form last couple of years.
The Pakistanis in the Netherlands are a small groups that mostly lives in three major cities Amsterdam Rotterdam and the Hague. Following their area of origin in Pakistan, their different migration history and their scattered existence in the Netherlands it is difficult to speak of a single ‘Pakistani community’: settled in the Hague ‘people of Gujrat’ with their cast or biraderi base links have least in common with the bulk of Memons from Karachi living in Amsterdam. Similarly the fortune seekers migrated in the 1970s are of different orientations than the asylum seekers of 1980s. However experiences in the Netherlands through religious and social gatherings; emergence of some youth groups that look for common boundaries and the emergence of in-group marriage patterns among the Dutch Pakistanis shows tendencies towards materialization of a single community. The organization of the ‘Pakistani Mela’ should also be seen a step in that direction.
Like elsewhere the Pakistani Mela in Amsterdam exhibited stands with variety of Pakistani culinary, women dresses, henna paintings, books etc. Beside some traditional sports like Kabaddi, a musical program was arranged a famous Pakistani female singer was invited, beside many local Pakistani and Indian musicians. From food to music and other aesthetic styles exhibited, the ‘Pakistani culture’ cannot be thought outside of the wider South Asian cultural mixings. Thus a Pakistani dress show with peculiar party and marriage dresses by a local boutique shop depicted the designs and choices of the middle classes in India and Pakistan. Interestingly almost all the female models were from the Surinamese origin, which shows certain conservatism of Pakistanis with regard to the social role of their women.
These cultural similarities were further visible among the participants with many Sikh, of the Indian Punjab origin, and Surinamese who are regular visitors of any Pakistani cultural gathering. The event of Kabaddi—a rural Punjabi male sport exposing body and muscles, was cancelled apparently due to bad weather. The whole event was widely advertised: there were stalls of Dutch entertainers for the kids, and even the VU University researcher in cooperation with the City Council department of health had also their stand for a research on the dietary practices of the Pakistani. It shows an increase in interest in otherwise a ‘hidden’ Pakistani group in the Netherlands.
The host of the musical program was keen in announcing the names of the sponsors, and even once she got a big boo from the audience when she interrupted the music event for this purpose. However these sponsors were also important for establishing such a Mela. Going through some names of the sponsors like ‘Taste of Lahore’, ‘Sahil Cosmetics’, A. F. Toko’, shows the development of a segment of entrepreneurs among the Pakistanis in the last twenty years. Beside their representation in catering business, the Pakistanis profited from developments in telecommunication and liberalization of cab companies. Following some studies more than 70% of the telephone shops, belwinkels, in Amsterdam are run by Pakistanis; similarly they have a quite a share in the emerging business of cab-companies--- in Rotterdam they are stereotyped as ‘Taliban Taxis’ following their competition with other groups.
These emerging entrepreneurs with different background were brought together under patronage of the Pakistani embassy to organize the Mela. More than their common Pakistani heritage, a common factor among them was that they have establish themselves through their businesses and networks within the Dutch society after an uneasy migration experience. But their personal ambition are usually creating hurdles in joining hands for some common cause or shaping the contours of a ‘community’ with diverse people and belongings. Thus it is seen that the personal ambitions of the ‘leaders’ lead to emergence of different factions and groups in different Dutch cities. The communal politics of Pakistanis revolves around the competitions of these factional groups and figures. For the moment the ambassadorial interventions are needed to create the events like the Pakistan Mela that provide a diverse ‘community’ some common platform. At the same time through these events these migrant groups are finding their ways and personal means to create space for themselves and to register their cultural forms within the Dutch society.
The Pakistanis in the Netherlands are a small groups that mostly lives in three major cities Amsterdam Rotterdam and the Hague. Following their area of origin in Pakistan, their different migration history and their scattered existence in the Netherlands it is difficult to speak of a single ‘Pakistani community’: settled in the Hague ‘people of Gujrat’ with their cast or biraderi base links have least in common with the bulk of Memons from Karachi living in Amsterdam. Similarly the fortune seekers migrated in the 1970s are of different orientations than the asylum seekers of 1980s. However experiences in the Netherlands through religious and social gatherings; emergence of some youth groups that look for common boundaries and the emergence of in-group marriage patterns among the Dutch Pakistanis shows tendencies towards materialization of a single community. The organization of the ‘Pakistani Mela’ should also be seen a step in that direction.
Like elsewhere the Pakistani Mela in Amsterdam exhibited stands with variety of Pakistani culinary, women dresses, henna paintings, books etc. Beside some traditional sports like Kabaddi, a musical program was arranged a famous Pakistani female singer was invited, beside many local Pakistani and Indian musicians. From food to music and other aesthetic styles exhibited, the ‘Pakistani culture’ cannot be thought outside of the wider South Asian cultural mixings. Thus a Pakistani dress show with peculiar party and marriage dresses by a local boutique shop depicted the designs and choices of the middle classes in India and Pakistan. Interestingly almost all the female models were from the Surinamese origin, which shows certain conservatism of Pakistanis with regard to the social role of their women.
These cultural similarities were further visible among the participants with many Sikh, of the Indian Punjab origin, and Surinamese who are regular visitors of any Pakistani cultural gathering. The event of Kabaddi—a rural Punjabi male sport exposing body and muscles, was cancelled apparently due to bad weather. The whole event was widely advertised: there were stalls of Dutch entertainers for the kids, and even the VU University researcher in cooperation with the City Council department of health had also their stand for a research on the dietary practices of the Pakistani. It shows an increase in interest in otherwise a ‘hidden’ Pakistani group in the Netherlands.
The host of the musical program was keen in announcing the names of the sponsors, and even once she got a big boo from the audience when she interrupted the music event for this purpose. However these sponsors were also important for establishing such a Mela. Going through some names of the sponsors like ‘Taste of Lahore’, ‘Sahil Cosmetics’, A. F. Toko’, shows the development of a segment of entrepreneurs among the Pakistanis in the last twenty years. Beside their representation in catering business, the Pakistanis profited from developments in telecommunication and liberalization of cab companies. Following some studies more than 70% of the telephone shops, belwinkels, in Amsterdam are run by Pakistanis; similarly they have a quite a share in the emerging business of cab-companies--- in Rotterdam they are stereotyped as ‘Taliban Taxis’ following their competition with other groups.
These emerging entrepreneurs with different background were brought together under patronage of the Pakistani embassy to organize the Mela. More than their common Pakistani heritage, a common factor among them was that they have establish themselves through their businesses and networks within the Dutch society after an uneasy migration experience. But their personal ambition are usually creating hurdles in joining hands for some common cause or shaping the contours of a ‘community’ with diverse people and belongings. Thus it is seen that the personal ambitions of the ‘leaders’ lead to emergence of different factions and groups in different Dutch cities. The communal politics of Pakistanis revolves around the competitions of these factional groups and figures. For the moment the ambassadorial interventions are needed to create the events like the Pakistan Mela that provide a diverse ‘community’ some common platform. At the same time through these events these migrant groups are finding their ways and personal means to create space for themselves and to register their cultural forms within the Dutch society.
maandag 13 juni 2011
'The Road is Occupied' روڈ لگا ھے'
During my recent visit I saw rapid changes in Rawalpindi – a garrison city and headquarters of Pakistan’s military, which both revealed an expansion of the military’s influence and its increased vulnerability, something affecting the collective psyche of the people.
In Rawalpindi I was staying in a lower working class neighborhood near Saddar or Cantonment, which sits alongside an important road that links the city centre with the Airport. Further along, the same road leads to the adjoining city, Islamabad, it is therefore frequently used by military generals, politicians and visiting officials to Pakistan. In the last five to six years the road has been totally transformed and now hosts flyovers, overhead bridges and service roads. These transformations are related to and consequent of the so called ‘war against terror’ and impacts upon the daily life of the people living in its surroundings in specific ways.
Central to these transformations and impacts is the event I witnessed and refer to here as ‘road laga hay’ or ‘the road is occupied’. About fifteen minutes before the ‘occupation’ of the road a military van with a blaring siren sped along the road and a uniformed soldier could be seen waving a red flag and instructing everybody to vacate the road. Seconds later military personnel carrying guns were on the scene and occupying different parts of the road and crossings asked all the passerby and drivers to leave the road within 15 minutes. The entire road was cleared and armed personnel stops at all crossroad corners and junctions. The road occupation prevented all access and movement towards the main road and remained so until the high ranking Pakistan officials and their vehicles had passed along the road. This is a frequent daily occurring which many local residents living along or relying on the road have had to accept and adapt to.
The impacts and effects of such daily road occupations were largest in the neighborhood where I stayed. This neighborhood near Saddar is a lower working class area, with many small streets and alleys, and houses are often small and owned or rented by mainly non-contractual laborers and low ranking government servants. If one wants to rent an apartment in the neighborhood locals are asked to show their national ID card at the local police station. There are shopkeepers who having established their businesses along the road and who are often asked by the armed militant men to close their businesses when the road is ‘occupied’. . It is perhaps the vulnerability of the road and the demography of the neighborhood which makes military personnel suspicious of potential security threats and which in turn lead to such extensive security measures.
A wounded City
Strict security measures are arguably a consequence of a number of bomb blasts and militant attacks in the area over the last ten years. There were two bomb attacks waged against the entourage of the former ruler General Musharraf as it passed on the outskirts of this neighborhood. Another major blow for the military was an attack and siege of its headquarters in 2009. All these attacks, involving mostly military institutes and personnel located in the area resulted in frequent casualities. Often new roads, squares and various military housing schemes are named after the soldiers and officers killed during bomb attacks or those killed during military actions in the areas bordering Afghanistan. Thus a casual traveler will see road signboards with names often ending with shaheed or ‘martyr’ that the present day conflict is creating.
These semantic and visual impressions are further extended by other attempts at sanctifying and sacralizing the road. All along the road from the airport to Saddar, the lamp posts are inscribed with one of the ‘99 names of Allah’, written in Arabic and with Urdu translation. It is possible that a frequent visitor could learn these name by heart in the course of his/her journeys. Yet besides these memorizing exercises, such sacralization attempts are also intended to engrave in space and create a collective truth of being a particular kind of Muslim who is against the militant jihadis in the ongoing ‘war against terrorism’.
The Mundane Interests
This inscription and sacralization of space runs alongside the mundane happenings also. In the last decade Rawalpindi, along with other major cities in Pakistan, have witnessed a mushrooming growth of military housing schemes. The outskirts of Rawalpindi are now dominated by military led investments in real estate creating new clusters of gated suburbs within the city. Such gated suburbs are dominantly occupied by retired service personnel, an emerging middle class and overseas absentee residents. Besides providing security to these gated communities, the military initiated a network of security agencies in the urban areas providing protection to the private institutes, businesses and foreign missionaries, something which also worked to create jobs for its retired personnel. The state of political and social unrest and resulting securitization of Pakistan also translate in such booming business.
There has been then an increasing militarization of the city which has built on the fact that military services have always been a major source of employment in the area. Rawalpindi, and the adjoining three districts, provide more than 50% of the total foot soldiers needed for the Pakistani military--- a tradition that goes back to the colonial times. Many of my cousins resident in the area have also served in one way or another the military. With the increasing investments of the military in oil, agriculture and the financial sector--- and thus converting itself into an ‘enterprising army’, more civil personnel are now incorporated into the affiliated military institutions. This transformation of the military has arguably also affected the way ordinary people understand and relate to the military. For example, it is now a truism that if you lose your mobile phone, it is possible to trace and get it back if you have a good friend working within the ISI, the intelligence branch of the military. Considering this dominant economic and social position of the military, it is perhaps not that suprising that in response to criticisms against the Pakistan army in the aftermath of bin Laden’s murder the first pro-military demonstrations were held in Rawalpindi.
The Pakistan military is sometimes called the ‘state within a state’[1], and now stands and operates in a complex relationship between the state and the people. The military provides a livelihood for the people, but under the present circumstances of violence, insecurity and terror, it also provides a symbolic justification for violence through simultaneously spatially inscribing and invoking an umbrella of sacredness that embraces the lives of the people.
[1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1750265.stm
In Rawalpindi I was staying in a lower working class neighborhood near Saddar or Cantonment, which sits alongside an important road that links the city centre with the Airport. Further along, the same road leads to the adjoining city, Islamabad, it is therefore frequently used by military generals, politicians and visiting officials to Pakistan. In the last five to six years the road has been totally transformed and now hosts flyovers, overhead bridges and service roads. These transformations are related to and consequent of the so called ‘war against terror’ and impacts upon the daily life of the people living in its surroundings in specific ways.
Central to these transformations and impacts is the event I witnessed and refer to here as ‘road laga hay’ or ‘the road is occupied’. About fifteen minutes before the ‘occupation’ of the road a military van with a blaring siren sped along the road and a uniformed soldier could be seen waving a red flag and instructing everybody to vacate the road. Seconds later military personnel carrying guns were on the scene and occupying different parts of the road and crossings asked all the passerby and drivers to leave the road within 15 minutes. The entire road was cleared and armed personnel stops at all crossroad corners and junctions. The road occupation prevented all access and movement towards the main road and remained so until the high ranking Pakistan officials and their vehicles had passed along the road. This is a frequent daily occurring which many local residents living along or relying on the road have had to accept and adapt to.
The impacts and effects of such daily road occupations were largest in the neighborhood where I stayed. This neighborhood near Saddar is a lower working class area, with many small streets and alleys, and houses are often small and owned or rented by mainly non-contractual laborers and low ranking government servants. If one wants to rent an apartment in the neighborhood locals are asked to show their national ID card at the local police station. There are shopkeepers who having established their businesses along the road and who are often asked by the armed militant men to close their businesses when the road is ‘occupied’. . It is perhaps the vulnerability of the road and the demography of the neighborhood which makes military personnel suspicious of potential security threats and which in turn lead to such extensive security measures.
A wounded City
Strict security measures are arguably a consequence of a number of bomb blasts and militant attacks in the area over the last ten years. There were two bomb attacks waged against the entourage of the former ruler General Musharraf as it passed on the outskirts of this neighborhood. Another major blow for the military was an attack and siege of its headquarters in 2009. All these attacks, involving mostly military institutes and personnel located in the area resulted in frequent casualities. Often new roads, squares and various military housing schemes are named after the soldiers and officers killed during bomb attacks or those killed during military actions in the areas bordering Afghanistan. Thus a casual traveler will see road signboards with names often ending with shaheed or ‘martyr’ that the present day conflict is creating.
These semantic and visual impressions are further extended by other attempts at sanctifying and sacralizing the road. All along the road from the airport to Saddar, the lamp posts are inscribed with one of the ‘99 names of Allah’, written in Arabic and with Urdu translation. It is possible that a frequent visitor could learn these name by heart in the course of his/her journeys. Yet besides these memorizing exercises, such sacralization attempts are also intended to engrave in space and create a collective truth of being a particular kind of Muslim who is against the militant jihadis in the ongoing ‘war against terrorism’.
The Mundane Interests
This inscription and sacralization of space runs alongside the mundane happenings also. In the last decade Rawalpindi, along with other major cities in Pakistan, have witnessed a mushrooming growth of military housing schemes. The outskirts of Rawalpindi are now dominated by military led investments in real estate creating new clusters of gated suburbs within the city. Such gated suburbs are dominantly occupied by retired service personnel, an emerging middle class and overseas absentee residents. Besides providing security to these gated communities, the military initiated a network of security agencies in the urban areas providing protection to the private institutes, businesses and foreign missionaries, something which also worked to create jobs for its retired personnel. The state of political and social unrest and resulting securitization of Pakistan also translate in such booming business.
There has been then an increasing militarization of the city which has built on the fact that military services have always been a major source of employment in the area. Rawalpindi, and the adjoining three districts, provide more than 50% of the total foot soldiers needed for the Pakistani military--- a tradition that goes back to the colonial times. Many of my cousins resident in the area have also served in one way or another the military. With the increasing investments of the military in oil, agriculture and the financial sector--- and thus converting itself into an ‘enterprising army’, more civil personnel are now incorporated into the affiliated military institutions. This transformation of the military has arguably also affected the way ordinary people understand and relate to the military. For example, it is now a truism that if you lose your mobile phone, it is possible to trace and get it back if you have a good friend working within the ISI, the intelligence branch of the military. Considering this dominant economic and social position of the military, it is perhaps not that suprising that in response to criticisms against the Pakistan army in the aftermath of bin Laden’s murder the first pro-military demonstrations were held in Rawalpindi.
The Pakistan military is sometimes called the ‘state within a state’[1], and now stands and operates in a complex relationship between the state and the people. The military provides a livelihood for the people, but under the present circumstances of violence, insecurity and terror, it also provides a symbolic justification for violence through simultaneously spatially inscribing and invoking an umbrella of sacredness that embraces the lives of the people.
[1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1750265.stm
zaterdag 28 mei 2011
60 kilometers from bin Laden
The immediate reactions of Pakistanis on hearing of the murder of Osama bin Laden were divided--- between those showing disbelief and condemning the Americans, and those condemning bin Laden for causing calamity for Pakistan. However as the news emerged, I did not find any emotional outburst in the neighborhood where I stayed.
On the 1st of May, it was late in the evening when me and my family returned back from to our apartment after attending the wedding reception of a relative. Everybody was tired after the preparation and enactment of three day long wedding rituals, usual for Pakistani marriages. Just after midnight began the ‘load-shedding’ – a compulsory power cut that occurs many times during day and night in Pakistan, and we all fell asleep. Although the power cut usually means more mosquito attacks, that night we were so tired we didn’t even notice.
If the load-shedding began here in Rawalpindi, an adjacent city of Islamabad, where we were staying with family, it would have been the same time that it ended in Abbottabad --- a garrison town about 60 kilometer to the north and where bin Laden was hiding out, presumably for several years now. . Around that time US Navy Seals started their military action under the name ‘Geronimo’, and attacked the hide-out compound in Abbottabad. American commandos had already left the hide-out, taking with them the dead body of bin Laden, before the Pakistani military or intelligence agencies could make an assessment about the incident. It was late in the morning when I was awoken by a phone call from a friend who teaches in a local government College. He asked ‘if I was watching the TV’ and told me about the killing of bin Laden as a result of the American covered military action in Abbottabad. ”Sad thing is that the Americans came in helicopters, killed Osama and left, while our military kept sleeping” he said.
I sensed anger and distress in the tone of voice of my friend. I hurriedly searched for the remote control of the TV but becaue of the hectic chaos of the wedding nobody had watched the TV for the last couple of days and so it was no easy task. Under the dirty laundry spread across beds and sofas, finally I found the remote and turned the TV on. Different local channels showed the image of a half-furnished ‘compound’ with streams of incoming news running on the screen regarding the American action. The news obviously caused curiosity among the residents of the house now gathered around the TV: some were hurling abuse at the Americans while others said ”He was also responsible for several bomb blasts in Pakistan” reminding them of the daily terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Curiously not a single person used the word shaheed or martyr for Osama.
In the afternoon I had an appointment with a colleague at the International Islamic University in Islamabad. I took a taxi from Rawalpindi and it crossed through the streets of Cantonment where the headquarters of the Pakistani military are located. I did not observe any unusual security measures or gatherings of people along the road or on the squares. The taxi-driver, a retired soldier in his 50s, moaned about the hot weather while adjusting a wet piece of cloth on his head to keep himself cool. Obviously I wanted to talk with him about today’s incident: “how is it possible that he was hiding-out in Abbottabad—a military city? Where is the proof of his murder they didn’t show any proof of how they killed him”. On my suggestion that the announcement was made by the American President himself and that this is significant in showing that they might have really done it ‘this time’, he turned less assured about his position. ”Babu sahib (a term used for educated people) you know we do not know; these things are played at higher levels and about those decisions we are uneducated”, he tried to conclude this talk on a note of his powerlessness.
Such a helplessness augmented in the wake of total silence from the civil or military institutes to inform people about the actual events. This situation translated into a narrative of convulsive rage that I found in the words of a student at the Islamic University in Islamabad: ”as a Pakistani I am confused and shocked regarding the Osama incident, and how angry I am with this state of my mind?” There was an element of evaporated jingoism when people like him asked ”what was our military doing?”; therefore there was anger at the failure of the military and intelligence agencies. Somebody said ”If they knew, they should have taken an action of their own, and if they did not know, they are also guilty of negligence: in both cases they are incompetent”.
Whether or not the world will ever become enlightened about the actual position of the Pakistani military in Osama’s murder, in the days following the military had to clear its position through its presentation in the Pakistani Parliament where it apologized for its failure. For some Pakistanis this confession was a big thing on the part of the military, however for the majority it added to a more general mystery of how the military can determine the internal and external policies of the Pakistani state.
On the 1st of May, it was late in the evening when me and my family returned back from to our apartment after attending the wedding reception of a relative. Everybody was tired after the preparation and enactment of three day long wedding rituals, usual for Pakistani marriages. Just after midnight began the ‘load-shedding’ – a compulsory power cut that occurs many times during day and night in Pakistan, and we all fell asleep. Although the power cut usually means more mosquito attacks, that night we were so tired we didn’t even notice.
If the load-shedding began here in Rawalpindi, an adjacent city of Islamabad, where we were staying with family, it would have been the same time that it ended in Abbottabad --- a garrison town about 60 kilometer to the north and where bin Laden was hiding out, presumably for several years now. . Around that time US Navy Seals started their military action under the name ‘Geronimo’, and attacked the hide-out compound in Abbottabad. American commandos had already left the hide-out, taking with them the dead body of bin Laden, before the Pakistani military or intelligence agencies could make an assessment about the incident. It was late in the morning when I was awoken by a phone call from a friend who teaches in a local government College. He asked ‘if I was watching the TV’ and told me about the killing of bin Laden as a result of the American covered military action in Abbottabad. ”Sad thing is that the Americans came in helicopters, killed Osama and left, while our military kept sleeping” he said.
I sensed anger and distress in the tone of voice of my friend. I hurriedly searched for the remote control of the TV but becaue of the hectic chaos of the wedding nobody had watched the TV for the last couple of days and so it was no easy task. Under the dirty laundry spread across beds and sofas, finally I found the remote and turned the TV on. Different local channels showed the image of a half-furnished ‘compound’ with streams of incoming news running on the screen regarding the American action. The news obviously caused curiosity among the residents of the house now gathered around the TV: some were hurling abuse at the Americans while others said ”He was also responsible for several bomb blasts in Pakistan” reminding them of the daily terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Curiously not a single person used the word shaheed or martyr for Osama.
In the afternoon I had an appointment with a colleague at the International Islamic University in Islamabad. I took a taxi from Rawalpindi and it crossed through the streets of Cantonment where the headquarters of the Pakistani military are located. I did not observe any unusual security measures or gatherings of people along the road or on the squares. The taxi-driver, a retired soldier in his 50s, moaned about the hot weather while adjusting a wet piece of cloth on his head to keep himself cool. Obviously I wanted to talk with him about today’s incident: “how is it possible that he was hiding-out in Abbottabad—a military city? Where is the proof of his murder they didn’t show any proof of how they killed him”. On my suggestion that the announcement was made by the American President himself and that this is significant in showing that they might have really done it ‘this time’, he turned less assured about his position. ”Babu sahib (a term used for educated people) you know we do not know; these things are played at higher levels and about those decisions we are uneducated”, he tried to conclude this talk on a note of his powerlessness.
Such a helplessness augmented in the wake of total silence from the civil or military institutes to inform people about the actual events. This situation translated into a narrative of convulsive rage that I found in the words of a student at the Islamic University in Islamabad: ”as a Pakistani I am confused and shocked regarding the Osama incident, and how angry I am with this state of my mind?” There was an element of evaporated jingoism when people like him asked ”what was our military doing?”; therefore there was anger at the failure of the military and intelligence agencies. Somebody said ”If they knew, they should have taken an action of their own, and if they did not know, they are also guilty of negligence: in both cases they are incompetent”.
Whether or not the world will ever become enlightened about the actual position of the Pakistani military in Osama’s murder, in the days following the military had to clear its position through its presentation in the Pakistani Parliament where it apologized for its failure. For some Pakistanis this confession was a big thing on the part of the military, however for the majority it added to a more general mystery of how the military can determine the internal and external policies of the Pakistani state.
woensdag 23 maart 2011
The Terror of the 'War against terror'
A small piece for the standplaatswereld:
http://standplaatswereld.nl/2011/03/21/the-terror-of-the-%e2%80%98war-against-terror%e2%80%99/#more-4694
It looked like a scene from a Hollywood detective film. While driving in his car in a busy street of Lahore, an American took out his weapon and fired at two young men riding on a motorbike. The attacker stopped and emerged from his car. Then, using an even bigger automatic weapon, killed his antagonists, who were already injured and had fallen to the ground. The murdered Pakistanis were carrying weapons but they did not get a chance to pick these up and use them. In the meantime, elsewhere in Lahore, a black car with ‘tinted windows’ rushed to rescue the attacker. Hurrying on the wrong side of the road it crushed a passersby. However, before it could reach the attacker, the latter was arrested by the police.
http://standplaatswereld.nl/2011/03/21/the-terror-of-the-%e2%80%98war-against-terror%e2%80%99/#more-4694
It looked like a scene from a Hollywood detective film. While driving in his car in a busy street of Lahore, an American took out his weapon and fired at two young men riding on a motorbike. The attacker stopped and emerged from his car. Then, using an even bigger automatic weapon, killed his antagonists, who were already injured and had fallen to the ground. The murdered Pakistanis were carrying weapons but they did not get a chance to pick these up and use them. In the meantime, elsewhere in Lahore, a black car with ‘tinted windows’ rushed to rescue the attacker. Hurrying on the wrong side of the road it crushed a passersby. However, before it could reach the attacker, the latter was arrested by the police.
The incident opened up a plethora of speculations and ambiguities about the official status of the killer, Raymond Davis, who, in the meantime, has become a household name in Pakistan. The American Consulate in Lahore first mentioned that Davis belonged to the ‘technical staff’ of the Consulate; a day later the American Embassy in Islamabad issued a ‘new list of officials,’ mentioning Davis as a ‘staff member’ enjoying diplomatic immunity from a trial in the host country, Pakistan. The White House refused to name the arrested ‘American official,’ which in practice meant that the ‘official’ was a CIA agent. However, it asked for his release due to his ‘diplomatic’ status. Later president Obama entered into the controversy when he personally recognized Davis as ‘our diplomat in Islamabad’ and asked the Pakistani government to ‘avoid any step’ to start criminal charges in a Pakistani court.
Such inconsistencies on the part of the American officials were equally shared by their counterparts among the Pakistani government. The ministers and officials of the ruling People’s Party (PPP) gave contradictory statements about the alleged ‘diplomatic immunity’ of Davis. The foreign minister was expelled from his post when he challenged the official soft line that his government had adopted towards the issue. The weak and corrupt PPP government, surviving on IMF regulations, was already unpopular due to economic downturn, rising commodity prices and, not least, due to its failure to contain the domestic consequences of the ‘war against terrorism’. The government ambiguities on the issue are translated as a ‘selling out’ by the right wing parties and media. It caused a wave of anti-American feelings already abundant among the masses.
Hunting down ‘Terrorists’
These fears and conspiracies were feed on the slow unfolding of events that depict the shadowy aspects of the ‘war against terrorism’. It soon turned out that Davis worked for an American ‘security firm’, that is named ‘Xe’ in the media, and which is the new face of the infamous Blackwater Worldwide which was once active in Iraq. Like its embedded character during the Iraq war, the US media, including the New York Times, covered the actual background of Davis as it might ‘jeopardize his safety in Pakistani jail’. Furthermore the incident refers to the war inside the ‘war against terror’ involving layers of Pakistani security and military establishment: it turned out that the two Pakistanis killed by Davis were working for the Pakistani intelligence agency, ISI, and they were following Davis diligently to know the broader network of the recent American involvement within Pakistani society. Contrary to the ‘double agenda’ of former military ruler Musharraf regarding his alleged ‘half-hearted fight against the Taliban-AlQaeda’ networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the civilian PPP government turned more supportive to the US in the ‘war against terrorism’. As part this shift, unknown numbers of American security officials were dispatched to work in Pakistan.
This high level of cooperation between the civilian government and the US was already a thorn in the side of the Pakistani military establishment—- who ruled the country for the longest part of its history. The civilian government is now presented as failing to protect the ‘national interests’ of the country, while the military is readjusting its image as the ‘only savior’ of the country. Such efforts are also meant to mystify the failings of the military and intelligence agencies in this affair. The military generals are again sitting at the table alongside their US counterparts and the spymasters behind the curtains, to reframe their positions on this issue. In the longer run the incident has further weakened the working sphere of the civil institutes in Pakistan.
Until recently, Raymond Davis awaited his lot in a Pakistani jail. A court was to decide about his ‘diplomatic immunity’. Pakistani media and its frenzied anchorpersons held daily Davis’ trials that already cost victims—- a widow of one of the murdered Pakistani men committed suicide due to the rumors that the Pakistani officials are sending Davis back to America. Indeed, Davis was released by the court on March 16th on the basis of the diyat laws. These laws allow for release of the prisoner after payment of compensation money from the offender to the offended party beyond the court decisions.
At another level the US and Pakistani military and security agencies are re-determining the perimeters of their involvement in this ‘war against terrorism’ in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It occurs in a shadow where international media is mostly focused on the political developments in the Middle East. The American shadows are clearing away from the heads of the long-time dictators in the Middle East. However, in South Asia the US is deep in the midst of its muddled support to undemocratic forces, and for the absurdities of the ‘war against terrorism’.
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